
Government & PPP, 9 September 2026, 10 min read
What a Trade Deal Can't Do for US–Africa Trade
AGOA has been extended through 2028, and the debate over what replaces it is about sector-specific, conditional deals. Those settle rules between governments. Deals still happen firm to firm.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) now runs to 31 December 2028. Getting there took three steps in a year:
| Date | What happened | Expiry after the change |
|---|---|---|
| 30 September 2025 | AGOA's authorisation lapsed after Congress failed to agree a renewal | None (lapsed) |
| 3 February 2026 | A one-year extension, P.L. 119-75, was signed into law, retroactive to 30 September 2025 | 31 December 2026 |
| September 2026 | The Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027 (H.R. 6500) was signed, moving AGOA's end date to 2028 | 31 December 2028 |
The September law changed the end date and, as reported, nothing else about the programme. Eligibility is still decided country by country each year: the Congressional Research Service counts 32 eligible countries out of 49 potential beneficiaries, and USTR opened its review for 2027 eligibility in June 2026. That leaves a two-year horizon for a programme that exporters build factories and supply contracts around, and far short of the 15-year renewal that South Africa and US business groups asked for.
What the next instrument looks like
Short horizons invite a different kind of instrument, and the debate over what comes after AGOA has moved that way. When the February extension was signed, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said that AGOA "must demand more from our trading partners." USTR then asked for public comment on modernising AGOA (docket USTR-2026-0166, comments due 15 May 2026). The US Chamber of Commerce's submission called for a multi-year renewal, for "targeted (product-specific, sector-specific)" remedies before a country loses benefits altogether, and for language that rewards critical-minerals partnerships.
Put those together and the direction is clear: more conditional, more bilateral, more sector by sector. This essay calls that family of instruments a side letter, as shorthand: a targeted government-to-government commitment covering one sector or one corridor, negotiated where political will already exists rather than waiting for a grand renewal or a continental framework. Whatever the formal name of the next instrument, it is likely to look more like this than like the AGOA of the last 25 years.
It may well be the right instrument for the moment. It is also worth being precise about what it does, and what it leaves undone, because the gap between the two is where much of the intended trade still fails to happen.
What the instrument actually does
A side letter is a government-to-government commitment. It establishes, between two states, that a given sector will enjoy certain terms: tariff treatment, recognised standards, regulatory commitments, dispute mechanisms. Negotiated well, it removes a category of risk that no individual firm could remove on its own. It tells the market that the rules in this corridor, for this sector, are settled and backed by both governments.
That is valuable work. A textile side letter tells every textile firm on both sides that the policy environment is favourable and durable. It lowers the political and regulatory uncertainty that sits above every potential transaction.
But notice the altitude at which it operates. The side letter settles the rules between two governments. It does not, and cannot, conduct the transaction between two firms. After the instrument is signed, an actual textile manufacturer in one country and an actual buyer in the other still have to find each other, check each other, agree terms, and risk a first shipment across the border. The side letter has cleared the sky above them. It has not built the ground they stand on.
The gap the instrument leaves
This is the gap, and it decides the outcome. Commerce is executed firm to firm. A government-to-government instrument can make a sector legal, attractive and lower-risk at the policy level, and the deal still does not happen, because the two specific firms who would do it cannot establish the things no side letter speaks to.
The buyer cannot cheaply confirm that this particular manufacturer is real, solvent, and capable of delivering at the promised quality and volume. The manufacturer cannot cheaply prove its track record to a buyer who has never heard of it and has no way to read its standing in its home market. Neither has a structure that lets them risk a first transaction (escrow, staged delivery, recourse if it goes wrong) across a border where they have no shared history. The side letter guaranteed the rules. It said nothing about whether these two firms can read each other well enough to act on them.
The continent's own free trade agreement ran into this gap. Trading under the AfCFTA formally began on 1 January 2021. In October 2022 the AfCFTA Secretariat launched a Guided Trade Initiative with eight countries, because, it said, commercially meaningful trade had not started under the agreement. Its method was matchmaking: pairing specific businesses and products for export and import. The rules were in force. The firms still had to be introduced to each other.
AGOA shows a similar shape. The Congressional Research Service reports US imports under AGOA of $8.0 billion in 2024, down 13% from $9.3 billion in 2023, and concentrated in a few countries and industries. Crude oil was about a quarter of the total, and passenger vehicles and parts made up 64% of South Africa's AGOA-eligible exports. Much drives that concentration. But the preference is the same on paper for every eligible exporter, and the firms able to use it are few.
The function that outlived the funding
For years, part of that gap was filled by public institutions. The US government ran regional trade and investment hubs, for most of AGOA's life in Accra, Gaborone and Nairobi, to help African exporters use the programme, with funding and technical assistance delivered largely through USAID. A hub would help an exporter understand eligibility, assemble the documentation, find an American buyer and work through the first transaction. It was modest, technical work. It rarely made news.
That apparatus is gone. The CRS notes that USAID administered AGOA trade capacity-building before 2025, that the agency was shut down as of July 2025, and that it is unclear whether the administration will support this work through other initiatives. Reasonable people hold sharply different views about that shift. This essay takes no position on it. The change is the premise, not the argument.
The argument is narrower: the facilitation function those hubs performed did not end when the funding did. Strip away the agency and the budget lines, and the hubs reduced the cost for an American buyer and an African supplier to find each other, check each other and complete a first transaction across a corridor where neither could easily read the other. That friction is a property of the corridor, not of the institution that happened to pay it down. It comes from the gap between relationship-based commerce on one side and documentation-based commerce on the other, between thick public registries and thin ones, between a buyer who needs to check and a supplier with no standard way to be checked. When the institution winds down, the friction returns to its baseline.
And a trade-first posture raises the demand for that function rather than lowering it. A relationship built around market access, reciprocity and private investment is more transaction-intensive than one built around programme delivery: more firm-to-firm deals, more private capital looking for African counterparties it can underwrite. Each of those needs the two sides to be legible to each other. The new posture asks the private corridor to carry more weight at the moment the public support underneath it has been removed. That is not a criticism of the posture. It is an observation about sequencing.
What has to sit underneath
The side letter is not the thing to replace. It is the thing to complete. The policy layer it builds is necessary; it is simply not sufficient on its own, and it was never designed to be. What has to sit beneath it is a firm-level legibility layer: the means by which the two specific companies the instrument was meant to benefit can find, check and safely transact with each other. For a buyer, that starts with routine checks that anyone can run today, set out in our guide to finding and checking export suppliers in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, and with deal terms that stage the risk, covered in how to structure an import/export deal in Africa.
That layer is also partner-neutral and framework-neutral. It works under a US instrument, an AfCFTA protocol, an EU arrangement or a Gulf agreement equally, because it operates one level down from all of them, at the firm-to-firm layer where every one of those instruments ultimately has to pay out. The right way to hold it is as a complement to public capacity, not a replacement. Governments set terms, open doors and carry risk only they can carry; the firm-level layer does the checking and transaction work at a scale and unit cost that programme delivery never could. Both will be needed. The same logic sits behind the eighteen percent: most of what holds African trade back is not the tariff, and no tariff deal reaches it.
The claim worth being measured against
Here is the prediction I am willing to be held to.
By the time AGOA's current authorisation ends in December 2028, and over the years after, targeted bilateral and sector-specific instruments will spread across US–Africa corridors, and the share of intended trade they generate will track, more than anything else, whether a firm-level layer for checking counterparties exists underneath them. Demand for trade facilitation across those corridors will be higher in 2030 than in 2024, and a growing share of it will be met by private tools for checking counterparties and structuring transactions, working alongside rebuilt public capacity rather than in place of it.
The test is concrete. If trade in well-negotiated corridors rises to meet the agreements regardless of any firm-level infrastructure, the instrument alone was sufficient and I am wrong about the gap. If facilitation demand falls, I am wrong that the friction is structural. If the corridors that built legibility underneath their agreements convert visibly better than the ones that did not, the gap is real and the diplomacy was always going to need something beneath it.
The side letter is a sound move, and it deserves to be made, sector by sector, by the people who know how to make it. The argument here is not that the instrument is naive. It is that the instrument is incomplete by design: it settles the rules and leaves the deals to firms who still need a way to read each other.
If you are a firm in a sector that AGOA or a new bilateral instrument covers, do not wait for the next agreement to find your counterparty. List the services a hub or programme used to give you (eligibility advice, document preparation, buyer introductions, help with the first shipment) and mark which ones nobody now provides. Then prepare the record a foreign buyer would ask for first (registration, ownership, export history, references) in a form they can check without a call to your home market. Why that record matters more than the brand on the box is the subject of made in Africa, sold by other people.
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